Why should a scientist whose aim is to unravel the neural mechanisms of perception consider 26 brain-body interactions seriously? Brain-body interactions have traditionally been associated 27 with emotion, effort, or stress, but not with the "cold" processes of perception and attention. 28
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4 blindness (Mack and Rock, 1998) , change blindness (Simons and Levin, 1997) , or during the 71 attentional blink (Shapiro et al., 1997) . It thus seems that both attention and consciousness 72 correspond to "perceiving better". 73
However, the fact that attention facilitates the report "I have seen the stimulus" that is 74 the hallmark of visual consciousness does not imply that attention and consciousness are the 75 M A N U S C R I P T
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7 require an additional and optional processing step proceeding from higher-order to lower-164 order areas. 165
The reverse hierarchy theory (Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002) was initially proposed to 166 account for findings in perceptual learning but fits with experimental findings in the domain 167 of perception and attention, such as the fact that attention proceeds from higher-order to 168 lower-order visual areas (Luck et al., 1997; Mehta et al., 2000; Buffalo et al., 2010) . However, 169 the crucial prediction that conscious percepts are preferentially formed at a global level 170 remained to be validated. To test this prediction, we designed new stimuli that are truly 171 hierarchical, as opposed to the classic Navon's letters (Navon, 1977; Kimchi, 1992) . Stimuli 172 were composed of local and global information that could be varied independently, but where 173 global information existed only by virtue of local information (Campana et al., 2016) . We 174 verified three key predictions. The brain has other major sources of bodily information: the viscera, that include 206 organs such as the heart and the gut, constitute another excellent but overlooked candidate. 207
Both the gut and the heart are pacemakers, in the sense that they generate their own electrical 208 activity. While the pacemaker activity of heart is well known, the discovery that the digestive 209 tract is lined with a specific cell type that intrinsically and continuously generates a slow 210 electrical rhythm is more recent (Kelly and (Murphy et al., 2014) . 217
We propose to view both the gut and heart as ticking clocks that constantly send 218 intrinsically-generated ascending information up to the central nervous system. They could 219 thus provide a stable source of signals defining the organism as an entity at the neural level. 220
The monitoring of those signals by the brain would thereby create an ego-centric, self-221 Importantly, visceral signals do not have to necessarily indicate a change in bodily state to 228 contribute to conscious perception, as opposed to their proposed role in influential theories on 229 the self (Craig, 2002; Damasio, 2010) or on emotion, such as the James-Lange theory or the 230 somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1996) . 231
232

Neural responses to heartbeats 233
Cognitive neuroscience is fortunately equipped with a powerful tool to study the 234 neural monitoring of the heart: heartbeat-evoked responses (Schandry and Montoya, 1996) . 235
Heartbeat evoked responses are obtained by averaging electrophysiological data time-locked 236 to heartbeats (Schandry et al., 1986) . They can thus be considered as equivalent to classical 237 evoked responses obtained by time-locking data to the presentation of a visual or auditory 238 stimulus, but in this instance, the stimulus is internal. It is also important to bear in mind the 239 presence of an associated cardiac artefact, because sensors on the head pick up not only the 240 neural response to heartbeats, but also the electro-cardiogram (Dirlich et al., 1997) . After a variable delay, a grating could appear or not. Participants were simply required to 291 indicate at the end of the trial whether they thought a stimulus had been presented or not. This 292 classic paradigm typically requires a subjective judgment, referring to a visual experience that 293 cannot be verified objectively by the experimenter: stimulus contrast was maintained constant, 294 but participants saw the stimulus in some trials, and did not see it in others. To verify the 295 reliability of participants' reports, catch trials, that did not contain any stimulus, were 296 intermixed with stimulus-present trials. False alarms, i.e. reporting seeing a stimulus when 297 nothing was presented, were rare (2.6% of stimulus-absent trials), indicating that participants 298 did not answer randomly. 299
A classical approach to such an experiment would be to focus on perceptual 300 processing and decision making. Here, we adopted a different perspective. responses to heartbeats occurred at a moment when there was no difference between hits and 314 misses in none of the cardio-respiratory parameters we measured (electrocardiogram, heart 315 rate, blood pressure, respiration rate and phase). 316
317
The heartbeat evoked response co-varies with perceptual sensitivity, not decision criterion 318
nor arousal 319
The amplitude of heartbeat evoked responses before stimulus onset accounts for a 320 modulation of the hit rate. But what does this modulation reflect? We first checked that theM A N U S C R I P T
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results did not reflect a global, non-specific difference in arousal state between hits and 322 misses. There was no evidence that arousal differed between hits and misses before stimulus 323 onset: neither alpha power, nor pupil diameter, nor any of the measured cardio-respiratory 324 parameters revealed any difference. In addition, the visual response to the warning stimulus 325 was identical in hits and misses, suggesting that the larger responses to heartbeats in hits were 326 not the result of a general, non-specific increase in cortical reactivity. 327
We then tested whether neural responses to heartbeats co-varied with sensitivity or 328 criterion, and found clear-cut evidence that neural responses to heartbeats co-vary with 329 perceptual sensitivity, not with decision criterion (Figure 2C ). In addition, the size of the 330 effects of neural responses to heartbeats on sensitivity and hit rate were similar to the effects 331 of spatial attention that we observed in previous experiments. We found that the amplitude of 332 the neural response to heartbeats accounts for 5 to 10 points of hit rate and for an 8% increase 333 in sensitivity. Using similar gratings at threshold and manipulating spatial attention, we found 334 in previous experiments that endogenous spatial attention modulates hit rate by 9 points 335 (Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008), and that exogenous spatial attention modulates sensitivity 336 by 6% (Sergent et al., 2013) . To summarize, neural activity obtained in response to heartbeats 337 is used as sensory evidence in the final decision, and has as much influence on perceptual 338 behavior as spatial attention would. But is it attention, or a neural marker of the "I"? 339
340
Neural responses to heartbeats index self-relatedness 341
Let us consider an attentional interpretation. It is known that when participants pay 342 attention to their heartbeats, the amplitude of the heartbeat-evoked response increases 343 (Schandry and Montoya, 1996) . It seems unlikely that participants were counting or explicitly 344 paying attention to their heartbeats while attempting at detecting a grating at threshold. 345
Besides, interoceptive attention modulates activity in the insula , 346 whereas we found the largest differential responses to heartbeats in vACC-vmPFC and rIPL. 347
However, it might be that participants' attention sometimes wandered away from the task and 348 the screen, and turned inwards, to internal, task-unrelated thoughts. Such an "attention 349 inward" situation would lead to both larger responses to heartbeats and a greater probability 350 of missing the stimulus displayed on screen. This interpretation does not fit with the observed 351 data: larger responses to heartbeats were associated with an increase in hit rate, not with an 352 increase in miss rate as predicted by the "attention inward" interpretation.
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If neural responses to heartbeats are not related to an attentional effect, how can they 354 behave as sensory evidence? Neural responses to heartbeats co-vary with visual sensitivity but 355 are neither directly related to visual processing, since it occurs in response to heartbeats 356 outside the visual system, nor directly related to the attentional modulation of visual 357 processing. To interpret this intriguing finding, it is useful to explicitly formulate the 358 statement that corresponds to hits and misses. In response to the same physical stimulus, 359 participants report "I have seen the grating" in hits, and "I have not seen anything in misses". 360
The classical approach to determine the neural mechanisms leading to such a statement 361 focuses on perceptual and decisional processes. We suggest here that neural responses to 362 heartbeats might have something to do with the "I" part of the sentence, with the fact that this 363 statement comes from a subject having an experience: saying "I have seen the stimulus" 364 implies the existence of the first-person perspective of the experiencing subject (Park and 365
Tallon-Baudry, 2014). 366
This interpretation is strengthened by a series of recent experiments pointing toward a 367 direct link between cardiac inputs and the self. We ran an interrupted thought experiment, 368
where participants could let their mind wander freely but were interrupted from time to time 369 and asked to rate the self-relevance of the current thought. In two separate experiments using 370 either MEG in healthy participants (Babo-Rebelo et al., 2016a) or intracranial EEG in 371 epileptic patients (Babo-Rebelo et al., 2016b), we found that neural responses to heartbeats 372 indexed self-relevance (Figure 2 D) . Self-relevance was defined as thinking about oneself, 373 such as in "I am thirsty", or as being the subject experiencing or acting in the thought, such as 374 "I will go to the supermarket this evening". Participants were first trained to rate the self-375 relevance of written sentences, corresponding to thoughts reported verbally by a pilot group 376 of participants. In a second step, participants were tested on a new set of written sentences. 377
Inter-participant agreement on the ratings was high, showing that participants had understood 378 how to use the self-relevance scales. We then proceeded with the recordings, while 379 participants rated their own spontaneous thoughts. 380
Neural responses to heartbeats in vmPFC varied depending on whether the participant 381 was thinking about himself/herself, or about an external object or event. This effect could be 382 as well as proprioceptive and vestibular inputs (Blanke, 2012) . Besides, while we focused 420 here on perception, our proposal can in principle extend to any cognitive process that includes 421 a subjective aspect, for instance subjective value in value-based decision-making, or 422 emotional appraisal. 423
424
From correlation to causation 425
The evidence presented in this article is correlational: neural responses to heartbeats 426 before stimulus onset correlate with visual sensitivity, neural responses to heartbeats correlate 427 with self-relevance. These correlation could stem from a third factor influencing both 428 heartbeat related neural processing, and visual subjective experience or self-relevance. 429
Typical third-factor candidates are attention and arousal. We have argued above that attention 430 to the external environment vs. attention to the body is unlikely, and we could not detect 431 changes in arousal state as measured with heart rate, pupil diameter or cortical alpha rhythm. experience, but implies that the suppression of all afferent cardio-vascular information is 470 probably difficult to achieve in humans, where subjective reports can best be probed. 471
472
Another promising option is to establish a mechanism of integration of visual 473 information and visceral information, and then selectively perturb it. One needs to identify 474 when and how sensory evidence in the visual system is combined with the self-related 475 information carried by neural responses to heartbeats in the default network. This question 476 taps onto the general issue of large-scale information integration in the brain, that is far from 477 being solved. Still, if a specific integration mechanism, be it convergence in a given area or 478 oscillatory synchrony at a given frequency between two areas, were identified, this 479 mechanism could be selectively disrupted using transcranial magnetic stimulation for instance. We propose here that conscious visual experience results from the integration of visual 503 content with an egocentric, self-related reference frame based on the neural monitoring of 504 visceral organs (Figure 1 ). This proposal accounts for both the "I-related" and vision-related 505 aspects of the report "I have seen the stimulus" that is the hallmark of visual consciousness. 506
While recent experimental evidence support our proposal, the mechanism integrating visual 507 information and neural responses to heartbeats, that are encoded in distinct brain areas, 508 remains to determined. In this framework, attention is not the selection process that brings 509 some items to the conscious mind, but rather a prioritization computational process that can 510 operate on, or be triggered by, either consciously perceived or unconsciously processed 511 
